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ADVANCING THE REBIRTH OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL COMMON LAW 
Jason J. Czarnezki* 
Mark L. Thomsen**
Abstract: Federal law often fails to mitigate environmental harm. An al-
ternative litigation response when federal avenues prove ineffective is re-
liance on state common law doctrines, especially public and private nui-
sance. A rebirth of the common law is occurring. This Article provides 
examples of the rebirth of environmental common law and suggests how 
common law claims and remedies in the environmental context can miti-
gate environmental harm. 
Introduction 
 Federal law strives to mitigate environmental harm such as air 
pollution and hazardous waste contamination, but with mixed results. 
The Clean Air Act (CAA) requires that air quality standards be estab-
lished for pollutants that endanger the public health and welfare.1 
Standards already exist for carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, 
ozone, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide.2 Yet, carbon dioxide is 
the major force behind global climate change, and no carbon dioxide 
standards exist despite efforts to make it a “criteria pollutant” under 
the CAA.3 In cases of hazardous waste contamination, some polluters 
agree to perform remedial work that may be unsuccessful or inade-
quate and does not provide complete property restoration for adja-
cent landowners.4 Federal environmental law fails to deter polluters 
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1 Clean Air Act § 108(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2000). 
2 40 C.F.R.§ 50.4−.12 (2005). 
3 See infra Part III.A; Kirk Johnson, 3 States Sue E.P.A. to Regulate Emissions of Carbon Diox-
ide, N.Y. Times, June 5, 2003, at B2; see also infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra Part III.B. 
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and protect the environment for a variety of reasons.5 For example, 
national standards may not be suitable for greenhouse gases,6 and 
federal agencies sometimes lack the resources to effectively perform 
restoration activities7 or federal standards are inadequate to restore 
affected resources to a state’s more stringent standard. An alternative 
litigation response when federal avenues prove ineffective is reliance 
on state common law doctrines, especially public and private nuisance. 
 A rebirth of the common law is already occurring.8 Under a 
common law public nuisance theory, states have ªled suit against en-
ergy companies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.9 Additionally, 
private landowners affected by hazardous waste contamination have 
begun to utilize common law private nuisance claims.10 A traditional 
advantage of common law claims is that their remedies allow for com-
pensation to the individual pollution victims.11 Moreover, with reme-
dies fashioned by the state courts, or federal courts applying state law, 
                                                                                                                      
5 See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Shifting Science, Considered Costs, and Static Statutes: The In-
terpretation of Expansive Environmental Legislation, 25 Va. Envtl. L.J. 431, 434 (2006) (dis-
cussing narrow interpretation of the federal environmental regulatory regime). 
6 See Véronique Bugnion & David M. Reiner, A Game of Climate Chicken: Can EPA Regulate 
Greenhouse Gases Before the U.S. Senate Ratiªes the Kyoto Protocol?, 30 Envtl. L. 491, 507 (2000) 
(“Moreover, the concept of a standard expressed in terms of a parts per million concentra-
tion is especially problematic for greenhouse gases because the United States is ‘only’ re-
sponsible for perhaps one-quarter of the global concentration of the gases. Thus, setting a 
national standard in the United States for greenhouse gas emissions would only accomplish a 
fraction of the emissions reductions needed to meet a global concentration target.”); 
Nicholle Winters, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air, but Is the EPA Correct That It Is Not an 
“Air Pollutant”?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1996, 2001–02 (2004) (citing Memorandum from Robert 
E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L. Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator 
(Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2_general_counsel_opinion.pdf 
(concluding that carbon dioxide cannot be regulated under the Clean Air Act (CAA) be-
cause “the nature of the global pool would mean that . . . the entire world would either be in 
or out of compliance. Such a situation would be inconsistent with a basic underlying premise 
of the CAA regime . . . .”)). While national standards for greenhouse gases may be “unwork-
able,” according to EPA, “regulating CO2 emissions from automobiles is perfectly feasible.” 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 69–70 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
7 See infra Part III.B. 
8 See Bruce Yandle, Common Sense and Common Law for the Environment: Cre-
ating Wealth in Hummingbird Economies 114 (1997); Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of 
Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 187, 
214 (1996). 
9 See infra Part III.A; see also Editorial, A Novel Tactic on Warming, N.Y. Times, July 28, 
2004, at A14; N.C. Sues TVA, Saying Emissions from Plants Make Residents Sick, Hurt Economy, 
Platts, Feb. 6, 2006 (on ªle with authors), available at http://construction.ecnext.com/ 
coms2/summary_0249-109630_ITM_platts. 
10 See Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 191; see also Part III.B (discussing Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of 
Wisconsin, Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County argued Dec. 6, 2004)). 
11 Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 222. 
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common law claims can also promote timely restoration of damaged 
natural resources and polluted lands—goals of the major federal envi-
ronmental statutes.12 As administrative agencies can have difªculty in 
implementing cleanup of polluted sites and deterring pollution, per-
haps common law courts should shoulder a greater share of this re-
sponsibility. 
 This Article, from a descriptive standpoint, provides examples of 
the rebirth of the environmental common law, and, for normative 
purposes, suggests how common law claims and remedies in the envi-
ronmental context can continue to ºourish. Part I of this Article dis-
cusses the common law origins of environmental law, as well as the 
public policy and environmental costs and beneªts of invoking com-
mon law remedies in environmental torts. Part II considers whether 
state common law remedies are preempted by federal environmental 
statutes. Part III describes two pending cases as examples of the re-
birth of the environmental common law, where common law reme-
dies were invoked to abate air and hazardous waste pollution. Part III 
also counsels on the difªculties of showing causation and determining 
remedies. Part IV offers up a valuable tool to promote the rebirth of 
the environmental common law and environmental restoration, argu-
ing that judges should apply a common law damage remedy in cases 
arising under state law, entitled the common law fund. 
I. The Common Law Origins of Environmental Law 
 Environmental law and regulation “has evolved . . . from reliance 
on tort law to an emphasis on end-of-pipe controls through direct 
regulation and ªnally to an emphasis on pollution prevention.”13 De-
spite the fact that common law tort claims have been used to abate 
pollution since the seventeenth century,14 the bulk of common law 
cases and lawsuits came during the late nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, creating what is now known as environmental law.15
 At common law, landowners have the right to enjoy the beneªts 
of their land free from “unwanted and unreasonable invasions by 
                                                                                                                      
12 See, e.g., Yandle, supra note 8, at 110; Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 223. 
13 Nancy Kubasek & Gary S. Silverman, Environmental Law 127 (2005). 
14 Yandle, supra note 8, at 88–90 (citing William Aldred’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 
(1611)). 
15 Roger E. Meiners, Stacie Thomas & Bruce Yandle, Burning Rivers, Common Law, and 
Institutional Choice for Water Quality, in The Common Law and the Environment 68 
(Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000). 
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people or pollution”16—sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.17 Prior to 
modern-day command and control statutes, the nuisance cause of ac-
tion was the main tool for environmental protection.18 Actions can be 
either public or private, and the nuisances themselves can be both.19 
A public nuisance claim can be brought against an action that inter-
feres with public health and rights.20 However, public nuisance ac-
tions are generally brought by a public ofªcial or a member of the 
public meeting the “special injury” requirement.21
 A private nuisance affects a limited number of land owners,22 and 
creates “a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and 
enjoyment of an interest in land.”23 The interference may be inten-
tional and unreasonable, or unintentional if negligent, reckless or 
abnormally dangerous.24 The Restatement (Second) of Torts balances the 
gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct to determine 
whether actions give rise to such a claim.25 Courts have taken various 
approaches to the balancing test.26 Some courts, rather than adopting 
the Restatement balancing approach, instead look for a level of inter-
ference that crosses some liability threshold.27 Despite the prevalence 
                                                                                                                      
16 Yandle, supra note 8, at 91. 
17 The Latin phrase means that one should use his or her own property in such a man-
ner as not to injure that of another. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 
1953). 
18 Yandle, supra note 8, at 91. The line between trespass, a direct physical invasion, 
and nuisance, an indirect invasion, has blurred over time, and there may be beneªts to 
suing in trespass as opposed to nuisance. For further discussion of common law environ-
mentalism, speciªcally nuisance and trespass, see Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common 
Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 923, 926–38 
(1999). 
19 Yandle, supra note 8, at 91. 
20 Id.; see also Meiners, Thomas, & Yandle, supra note 15, at 68. For a brief discussion of 
the law of public nuisance as it applies to environmental cases, see generally James A. 
Sevinsky, Public Nuisance: A Common-Law Remedy Among the Statutes, 5 Nat. Resources & 
Env’t 29 (1990). 
21 Yandle, supra note 8, at 91–92. 
22 Id. at 92. 
23 Id. (citing Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 4 N.W.2d 435 (Iowa 1942) and Lederman v. 
Cunningham, 283 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)); see also Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 
77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821F, 822 (1979). 
24 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822. 
25 Id. § 826. Factors to determine the gravity of harm include the extent and character 
of harm, social value of plaintiff’s use, suitability to location, and burden on plaintiff to 
avoid harm. Id. § 827. Factors to determine the utility of the actor’s conduct include social 
value of actor’s conduct, suitability to location, and impracticality of preventing harm. Id. 
§ 828. 
26 See Meiners, Thomas & Yandle, supra note 15, at 69–70. 
27 See, e.g., Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Wis. 1969). 
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of environmental tort claims, the difªculty of fashioning appropriate 
remedies may create problems when using tort law to control pollu-
tion and other environmental harms.28
 Courts can abate the activity by granting the plaintiff injunctive 
relief29 or requiring the victims to pay damages.30 The courts can al-
low the activity to continue if the defendant pays damages,31 or they 
can simply deny relief. However, an award of permanent damages may 
fail to abate the pollution because it leaves injured parties without a 
remedy for future harms and provides no motivation for the polluter 
to stop polluting if payment of damages is cost-effective.32 Common 
law damage remedies put courts in the difªcult informational posi-
tion of deciding what amount of damages is appropriate to compen-
sate the victims, or whether to limit pollution to a certain level.33
 Courts are also reluctant to grant an injunction for fear that its 
scope may be too broad or narrow and that, if the injunction is inef-
fective, bargaining will not take place between the parties.34 Courts 
often balance the economic harm caused by the pollution against the 
costs of the injunction, and, if the harm from the injunction is greater, 
courts will only award damages.35 In addition, tort law plaintiffs face 
the burden of having to show causation, which can be especially 
difªcult if there are multiple polluters, and often plaintiffs must ex-
pend substantial ªnancial resources to bring common law tort actions 
against entities having potentially far greater resources.36
 The difªculties in adjudicating common law tort claims progres-
sively caused a shift from tort actions to more direct regulation of en-
vironmental harm.37 Both state governments and the federal govern-
ment became more involved in the creation of command-and-control 
statutes and other legislation designed to set standards and mandate 
                                                                                                                      
28 See Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 13, at 132. 
29 See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). 
30 See, e.g., Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 690 (N.C. 1953). 
31 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 877 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1970). 
32 Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 13, at 132. 
33 See id. 
34 Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 8–15 (1960). 
35 Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 13, at 132. 
36 Id.; see also David Doege, A Pile of Legal Issues, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, June 26, 2004, 
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wauk/jun04/238996.asp (last visited Jan. 4, 
2007) (Marquette Professor Michael O’Hear stated, “These cases can be tremendously 
complicated. They can go on for years and they can cost millions just to litigate.”). 
37 For a brief summary of the transition from nuisance law to environmental regula-
tion, see Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 777–79 (5th ed. 2002). 
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compliance through threat of ªnes for violation.38 Beginning in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, state and federal statutes created regula-
tions to attempt to control pollution,39 and since that time there has 
been a proliferation of federal and state environmental statutes and 
administrative regulations.40
 Modern environmental law grew out of the common law tort sys-
tem, and modern regulation of pollution arose in an effort to deal with 
the inadequacies of the common law.41 However, in many instances, in 
light of the complexities and bureaucracies of modern environmental 
regulation, the common law still provides an effective mechanism for 
determining appropriate pollution levels.42 Thus, while neither com-
mon or statutory law is wholly sufªcient, the legal pendulum is swing-
ing back ever so slightly towards common law tort actions.43
 State common law can be an effective means to prevent and rem-
edy environmental pollution,44 as well as provide full compensation for 
harmed victims. In many circumstances, the federal environmental law 
regime has proven ineffective. Faced with ever-tightening budgets45 
and the inconsistency of environmental enforcement from administra-
tion to administration—continuing through George W. Bush’s presi-
dency46—it is no surprise that the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has found it difªcult to restrain polluters and restore already 
polluted ecosystems; as a result, cleanup of Superfund sites has been 
slow,47 and federal agencies often fail to regulate certain pollutants, 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Kubasek & Silverman, supra note 13, at 135; Yandle, supra note 8, at 108. 
39 Yandle, supra note 8, at 108. 
40 For a historical discussion of modern environmental law, see generally Richard J. 
Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law (2004). 
41 Yandle, supra note 8, at 108. 
42 Id. at 159. 
43 Cf. Meiners & Yandle, supra note 18, at 923–24 (“[P]rotection of environmental as-
sets seems to be headed back to its origins, to states, local governments, and local citizens 
. . . .”); Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 214; Eric E. Nelson & Curt R. Fransen, Playing with a Full 
Deck: State Use of Common Law Theories to Complement Relief Available Through CERCLA, 25 
Idaho L. Rev. 493, 493 (1988–89). 
44 After all, the primary goals of CERCLA are deterrence and restoration. See Jason J. 
Czarnezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Non-Use Values in Natural Resource Damage 
Assessments, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 509, 525 (2005). 
45 Felicity Barringer, The President’s Budget: Environment, Clean Water Fund Facing Major 
Cuts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2005, at A11. 
46 See, e.g., Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y. Times Mag., Apr. 4, 2004, at 39. 
47 See Congressional Budget Ofªce, Analyzing the Duration of Cleanup at 
Sites on Superfund’s National Priorities List 8 (March 1994), available at http://www. 
cbo.gov (follow “Publications by Subject Area” hyperlink; then follow “Environment” hy-
perlink; then scroll down to “1994” section). 
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such as carbon dioxide under the CAA. In addition, the cost recovery 
tools of federal law have themselves become burdensome, while the 
common law traditionally “allows for damaged parties to recover 
losses.”48
 In general, it seems the differences between federal environ-
mental statutes and state common law causes of action “mirror the 
advantages and disadvantages of federal and state law generally.”49 
However, the advantages of the common law, at least in some circum-
stances, are substantial. Rigorous enforcement of state nuisance and 
trespass law may promote a preference for prevention if the proper 
signals are sent to potential polluters.50 Under the common law, plain-
tiffs can recover damages to be used for cleanup and restoration, ob-
tain injunctions more easily, and enjoy broader liability parameters.51 
The common law allows for a “broad array of damages,”52 yet defen-
dants also can assert caveat emptor.53
 This is not to say that there are not disadvantages with the com-
mon law. Courts may not be able to easily design and monitor clean-
ups, and predictable outcomes and national standards may not exist 
without federal agency oversight.54 Courts may also lack the necessary 
information to fully assess and determine proper damage calcula-
tions, and injunctions may result in inefªcient results.55
 The pros and cons of state common law actions are not limited to 
legal consequences, but also to the practical logistics of plaintiff litiga-
tion. Plaintiffs, or in most instances their attorneys (in light of contin-
gency fees), must hire expensive scientiªc experts and perform costly 
and invasive scientiªc analyses of polluted sites.56 Plaintiffs must also 
be prepared to combat opposing expert witnesses.57 Then again, with 
                                                                                                                      
48 Meiners & Yandle, supra note 18, at 959–61 (citing Randall G. Vickery & Robert M. 
Baratta, Jr., Back to the Legal Future: Environmental Claims Come Full Circle as Plaintiffs Return to 
the Common Law for Relief, Nat’l L.J., June 10, 1996, at C1). 
49 Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 221. 
50 See Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, The Common Law: How it Protects the Environ-
ment, PERC Policy Series, Issue No. PS-13 (May 1998), available at http://www.perc.org 
(follow “Publication Library” hyperlink; then follow “Policy Series” hyperlink). 
51 Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 222–23. Consequential damages (for example, falling land 
values) are available when using common law remedies. Id.; see also Meiners & Yandle, su-
pra note 18, at 960. 
52 Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 198; e.g., Meiners & Yandle, supra note 50. 
53 Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 224. 
54 Id. at 225–26. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 226; Meiners & Yandle, supra note 50. 
57 See Michael C. Anibogu, The Future of Electromagnetic Field Litigation, 15 Pace Envtl. 
L. Rev. 527, 573 (1998). 
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ªnancial risks can come high returns. If a plaintiff is successful, pol-
luting defendants will think twice and proceed cautiously before ap-
pealing or continuing to pollute. The potential damages are high 
(making settlement a worthwhile choice if defendants are found li-
able in the trial court), and it is in the interests of polluting defen-
dants to avoid published appellate decisions stating that certain toxic 
emissions or leaks are nuisances under state law, despite existing 
agreements with federal actors.58
II. Preemption? The Relationship Between Federal Statutes 
and State Common Law 
 In order to utilize the common law, these traditional state causes 
of action must not be preempted by federal statutes.59 Speciªcally, 
does the Clean Water Act (CWA), Clean Air Act (CAA), or Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) preempt state common law doctrines, or is the state free 
to provide its own common law remedies? The CWA and CAA do not 
preempt state common law claims,60 and CERCLA preemption law 
still permits substantial state common law claims.61
A. Nuisance Preemption and the Clean Water Act 
 Much discussion has focused on the preemptive effect of the 
CWA, with many analyses concluding that the CWA should be seen as 
preserving preexisting remedies available under state law.62 The Su-
preme Court held, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, that the CWA 
did preempt a Vermont nuisance law to the extent that the law im-
posed liability on a New York point source, but the CWA did not bar 
individuals from bringing the nuisance claim pursuant to the law of 
the source state (here, New York).63 Thus, while the CWA preempted 
                                                                                                                      
 
58 See Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 222–24; Nelson & Fransen, supra note 43, at 514–17. 
59 We note that state statutes and federal common law are additional sources of au-
thority, and state statutes may preempt state common law claims. 
60 See infra Part II.A–B. 
61 See infra Part II.C. 
62 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law 287 (1994) (citing Robert L. 
Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121, 
172 (1985); Randolph L. Hill, Preemption of State Common Law Remedies by Federal Environ-
mental Statutes: International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 14 Ecology L.Q. 541, 545 (1987); 
Calvin R. Dexter & Teresa J. Schwarzenbart, Note, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois: The Demise 
of the Federal Common Law of Water Pollution, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 627, 664 (1982)). 
63 Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) (“The saving clause speciªcally 
preserves other state actions, and therefore nothing in the Act bars aggrieved individuals 
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one state’s nuisance law from being applied in another state, the CWA 
did not preempt a nuisance claim of the state where the pollution 
originated.64 “The Court is less likely . . . to ªnd federal preemption 
of state common law because it begins ‘with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the states were not to be superseded by [fed-
eral legislation] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’”65 The CWA does not expressly preempt state common law 
remedies.66 To the contrary, it preserves such remedies within the sav-
ings clause of the citizen suit provision of the Act.67 Legislative history 
of the citizen suit provision also indicates “an afªrmative recognition 
that state common-law rights and remedies were meant to survive en-
actment of the federal statute.”68 Thus, pursuant to existing case law, 
the plain language of the Act, and the legislative history behind the 
Act, the CWA does not preempt state common law environmental 
claims. 
B. Nuisance Preemption and the Clean Air Act 
 Like the CWA, the CAA does not preempt state common law nui-
sance claims.69 In another suit stemming from the facts of Ouellette, 
the court held that the CAA did not preempt state law nuisance 
claims by property owners for alleged air pollution damage arising 
from a paper mill.70 The court reasoned that “state law nuisance claims 
have always been available to private parties suing for damages for pol-
lution that travels between state boundaries.”71 Additional case law 
supports the ªnding that the CAA does not preempt state common 
                                                                                                                      
from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State.”). For a critique of 
current preemption jurisprudence and advocating allowing the nuisance laws of the af-
fected state, see generally Ann M. Lininger, Narrowing the Preemptive Scope of the Clean Water 
Act as a Means of Enhancing Environmental Protection, 20 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 165 (1996). 
64 Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497. 
65 See Glicksman, supra note 62, at 183 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 
304, 316 (1981)). 
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 186 & n.366. The clause provides that “[n]othing in this section shall restrict 
any right which any person . . . may have under any statute or common law to seek en-
forcement of any efºuent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(e) (2000). 
68 Glicksman, supra note 62, at 187; see also Thomas C. Buchele, State Common Law Ac-
tions and Federal Pollution Control Statutes: Can They Work Together?, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 609, 
641–42 (1986). 
69 See Rodgers, supra note 62, at 125. 
70 Ouellette v. Int’l Paper Co., 666 F. Supp. 58, 62 (D. Vt. 1987). 
71 Id. at 61. 
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law claims arising out of various instances of air pollution.72 Scholars 
have concluded that the CAA does not preempt state common law 
tort claims, using the same rationale as when discussing the CWA.73
C. Nuisance Preemption and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act 
 Sources diverge as to the extent CERCLA preempts state com-
mon law claims. CERCLA contains a savings clause, stating that “noth-
ing . . . shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State 
from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to 
the release of hazardous substances within such State.”74 Thus, it 
seems that Congress sought to have CERCLA “work in conjunction 
with other federal and state hazardous waste laws.”75 However, “CER-
CLA does preempt the application of state or local law to hazardous 
waste contamination where the state or local law is in actual conºict 
with CERCLA.”76 Courts have found preemption of state law where 
there is sufªcient conºict between the state law and CERCLA’s con-
tribution scheme, or where state law remedies would impair an effec-
tive cleanup.77
 Absent these limited scenarios, CERCLA does not preempt state 
law claims,78 including common law claims dealing with harm caused 
                                                                                                                      
 
72 See Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (holding 
that the CAA does not preempt source state common law claims against a stationary source 
and reasoning that preemption of state common law actions would entirely preclude com-
pensatory relief that plaintiffs may show is justiªed); see also Abundiz v. Explorer Pipeline 
Co., 2002 WL 1592604, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 17, 2002) (ªnding that the CAA did not 
preempt plaintiffs’ state tort law claims, derived from a spill of MTBE-treated gasoline). 
73 See Buchele, supra note 68, at 638–44; see also Andrew Mcfee Thompson, Free Market 
Environmentalism and the Common Law: Confusion, Nostalgia and Inconsistency, 45 Emory L.J. 
1329, 1344–46 (1996); Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 210–14. 
74 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (2000). 
75 See New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1225 (D.N.M. 2004) (citing 
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
76 Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 (illustrating actual conºict means that it is im-
possible to comply with both the federal and state law). 
77 See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002); XDP, 
Inc. v. Watumull Prop., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12057 (D. Ore. May 14, 2004); see also Greg-
ory M. Romano, Note, “Shovels First and Lawyers Later”: A Collision Course for CERCLA Clean-
ups and Environmental Tort Claims, 21 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 421, 441–45 
(1997); Steven H. Goldberg & Amilia Sanders, CERCLA: Cutting a Wider Path by Preemption 
of State Law Claims, Envtl. Litig. Comm. Newsl., Dec. 14, 2004. 
78 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, for example, found an industrial 
company liable for creating a public nuisance and violating state environmental laws for 
dumping hazardous chemicals in the ground near its manufacturing site. California v. 
Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 1998). Even though the court lacked jurisdiction to 
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by hazardous waste.79 When CERCLA remedies are inadequate, a 
plaintiff can turn to common law causes of action for relief, and there 
is a modern trend toward the expansion of the common law so these 
causes of action can coexist with a CERCLA action.80
III. Two Case Studies: Invoking the Common Law 
 This section describes two cases attempting to use state common 
law doctrines to abate environmental harm.81 In the ªrst, we focus on 
the difªculty of stating a claim and proving causation, while in the 
second, we focus on the evaluation of damage remedies. In Connecticut 
v. American Electric Power Co., state and local governments have ªled 
suit against power companies under state public nuisance law in order 
to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.82 In Dyer v. Waste Management of 
Wisconsin, despite the existence of agreements pursuant to CERCLA 
between polluters and the federal government, landowners have ªled 
suit under state private nuisance doctrine in an effort to cleanup ad-
jacent lands polluted with hazardous waste.83 Can, and should, these 
lawsuits relying on state doctrines of public and private nuisance 
prove successful? 
                                                                                                                      
allow an interlocutory appeal on the CERCLA issue, the court had the authority to hear 
both the nuisance claim and the state environmental claims, thus indicating that CERCLA 
may not preempt state law actions. Id. at 775–77. However, it is not at all clear that preemp-
tion was argued, and California v. Campbell was decided earlier than Fireman’s Fund Insur-
ance Co. v. City of Lodi. 
79 See, e.g., Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., 16 F.3d 1408, 1416–17 (4th Cir. 1994) (where the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that state law claims for injunctive relief were preempted by 
federal statute (although the federal statute here was the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), rather than CERCLA), but that state law claims for damages were not 
preempted by the federal statute); Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 826–31 
(Ill. 1981); State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 154, 160, 166 (N.J. 
1983) (ªnding a corporation liable under theories of nuisance, strict liability, and a New 
Jersey state environmental law); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1245 (R.I. 1982); see also 
Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law 
Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 903, 942–61 (2004) (discussing 
case law where state common law claims have been used to deal with hazardous wastes). 
80 See Joseph F. Falcone, III & Daniel Utain, You Can Teach an Old Dog New Tricks: The 
Application of Common Law in Present-Day Environmental Disputes, 11 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 59, 63 
(2000); see also Kuhnle, supra note 8, at 218–22; Nelson & Fransen, supra note 43, at 499–
508 (explaining that state common law remedies complement CERCLA and help obtain 
full and timely relief). 
81 For another case study, see generally John Harleston & Kathleen M. Harleston, The 
Suffolk Syndrome: A Case Study in Public Nuisance Law, 40 S.C. L. Rev. 379 (1999). 
82 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
83 Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County 
argued Dec. 6, 2004). 
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A. In Lieu of the Clean Air Act 
1. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 An effective tool is needed to help abate overwhelming green-
house gas emissions. Federal law has shown not to be the best instru-
ment to mitigate greenhouse gas production since carbon dioxide is 
not deªned as a CAA criteria air pollutant requiring National Ambi-
ent Air Quality Standards,84 nor as an air pollutant requiring emission 
standards for new motor vehicles.85 The federal government has 
failed to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions86 under the CAA despite 
the plain language of the Act.87
 Dissenting in Massachusetts v. EPA—the case which upheld EPA’s 
decision that the agency cannot and should not regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions from motor vehicles under the CAA—D.C. Circuit 
Judge Tatel argued that greenhouse gases “plainly fall within the 
meaning” of air pollutants to be regulated under the CAA.88 Tatel 
went on to argue that if the EPA administrator ªnds the gases con-
tribute to air pollution that puts the public’s health in danger, “then 
EPA has authority—indeed, the obligation—to regulate their emis-
                                                                                                                      
84 See also supra notes 3 & 6 and accompanying text. The Attorneys General of three 
states—Massachusetts, Connecticut and Maine—intended to force EPA to list carbon diox-
ide as a criteria pollutant under section 108 of the CAA, but voluntarily dismissed the suit 
in order to focus on litigation that carbon dioxide must be regulated in mobile sources 
under section 202 of the Act. For further discussion, see Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laborato-
ries for Local Solutions for Global Problems: State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing 
Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 15, 
75–82 (2006); Richard W. Thackeray, Jr., Struggling For Air: The Kyoto Protocol, Citizens’ Suits 
Under the Clean Air Act, and the United States’ Options for Addressing Global Climate Change, 14 
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 855, 888–94 (2004). However, the key question, regardless of 
whether you seek to regulate pollution under section 108 or 202 of the CAA, is whether 
any greenhouse gases can be considered an “air pollutant” under section 302(g) of the 
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000) (deªning “air pollutant” as “any air pollution agent or 
combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (in-
cluding source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material) substance or 
matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”). 
85 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding “EPA’s denial 
of a petition asking it to regulate carbon dioxide . . . and other greenhouse gas emissions 
from new motor vehicles under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)” 
in a 2–1 decision, with all judges on different grounds); see also Anthony DePalma, Court 
Says E.P.A. Can Limit Its Regulation of Emissions, N.Y. Times, July 16, 2005 at A11. 
86 Other greenhouse gases include methane, nitrous oxide, and hydroºuorocarbons. 
87 See Czarnezki, supra note 5, at 441. 
88 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 73 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
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sions from motor vehicles.”89 Currently, however, Congress has not 
explicitly mandated regulating greenhouse gases, and EPA has not 
voluntarily done so. Other than international initiatives, two other 
options remain available to mitigate greenhouse gas production: ªrst, 
state and local responses such as state legislation, municipal programs 
and initiatives,90 and second, state common law remedies such as pub-
lic and private nuisance. 
 A number of state and local governments have begun to consider 
programs and policies to limit the production of greenhouse gases.91 
While some of these programs are voluntary,92 there has been a 
movement by state ofªcials to recommend greenhouse gas emissions 
limits. For example, in 2003, Maine passed a law setting a statewide 
target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.93 More recently, the 
Governor of California outlined a non-binding proposal to reduce the 
state’s greenhouse gas emissions to year 2000 levels in less than ªve 
years, and eighty percent less than 1990 levels in forty-ªve years.94
                                                                                                                      
89 Id. A parallel argument was successfully made by plaintiffs in Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. 
EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148–56 (D.C. Cir. 1980), where the D.C. Circuit held that if EPA 
found lead emissions to endanger health and welfare, a nondiscretionary duty to list it as a 
criteria air pollutant arose. Thus, this argument might prove persuasive in both section 
202 and 108 suits. See McKinstry, supra note 84, at 76–77. But EPA, relying on FDA v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), concluded that “in light of the enormous 
economic and political consequences of regulating greenhouse gas emissions, Congress 
would have been far more speciªc if it had intended to authorize EPA to regulate the sub-
ject under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d at 56 n.1 (citing 
58 Fed. Reg. at 52,928). 
90 However, states and municipalities are reluctant to pass such laws. See Jonathan H. 
Adler, Heated Nuisance Suits, TCSDaily, July 27, 2004, available at http://www.tcsdaily.com/ 
Article.aspx?id=072704C (stating that it imposes costs on a home state to call for state 
legislation requiring signiªcant emission cuts). 
91 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, State and Local Greenhouse Gas Mitigation 
Case Studies, http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsStateCase 
Studies.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). For a detailed discussion of a variety of state and 
local responses to greenhouse gases and global climate change, see McKinstry, supra note 
84, at 26–58. Regional responses to greenhouse gases are also being considered. See An-
thony DePalma, 9 States in Plan to Cut Emissions by Power Plants, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2005 at 
A1; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm (last visited Jan. 
4, 2007); see generally Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A 
Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54 (2005). 
92 See New Hampshire’s Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions Registry, 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 125-L:3 (2005); see also New Hampshire Department of Envi-
ronmental Services, New Hampshire Greenhouse Gas Registry, http://www.des.state. 
nh.us/ard/climatechange/ghgr.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
93 38 Me. Rev. S. §§ 574–578 (2004) (calling for creation of a “climate change action 
plan” to reduce in-state carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 levels by 2010, to ten percent 
below 1990 levels by 2020, and eventually by as much as eighty percent). 
94 Katherine Ellison, Turned Off by Global Warming, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2006 at A13. 
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2. Common Law Claims and Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. 
 In the absence of strong federal or state initiatives, the common 
law provides another option for mitigation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions. As a primary example, in July 2004, eight states95 and New York 
City ªled suit in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. against ªve of 
the country’s largest power companies in an effort to force a reduc-
tion in carbon dioxide emissions.96 Plaintiffs assert claims of federal 
common law public nuisance, and assert public nuisance under the 
state common laws where the power plants are located.97 While the 
companies do not dispute that carbon dioxide contributes to global 
warming, they do challenge the plaintiffs’ assertion that carbon diox-
ide emissions constitute a public nuisance.98As the plaintiffs assert, 
“The action calls on the companies to reduce their pollution, and 
does not seek monetary damages.”99
 Speciªcally, the complaint alleges that the defendant companies 
have available to them “practical, feasible and economically viable op-
tions for reducing carbon dioxide emissions without signiªcantly in-
creasing the cost of electricity to their customers.”100 Plaintiffs seek an 
order holding the defendants jointly and severally liable for a public 
nuisance, and an injunction against each of the defendants to reduce 
emissions by “a speciªed percentage” each year for at least a dec-
ade.101 According to the complaint, global warming is a public nui-
sance because it adversely affects public health (for example, heat 
deaths due to prolonged heat waves and asthma), coastal, water, and 
agricultural resources, the water levels of the Great Lakes, and ºora 
and fauna.102
                                                                                                                      
95 The eight states are California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Is-
land, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
96 See Editorial, A Novel Tactic on Warming, supra note 9. 
97 Complaint ¶ 1, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (04-CV-05669, 04-CV-05670). The power plants are located in Alabama, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mex-
ico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia and Wis-
consin. 
98 Id. ¶ 23. 
99 Press Release, Ofªce of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Eight States & 
NYC Sue Top Five U.S. Global Warming Polluters ( July 21, 2004), available at http://www.oag. 
state.ny.us/press/2004/jul/jul21a_04.html. 
100 Complaint ¶ 5, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 265. 
101 Id. ¶ 6. 
102 Id. ¶¶ 3, 108–40. 
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 Since greenhouse gases are not regulated under federal law, the 
states may have viable nuisance claims under state laws.103 If global 
climate change can be found to be a public nuisance and the defen-
dant utilities responsible, the release of carbon dioxide can be abated. 
However, some have questioned whether the three percent per year 
emission reduction sought is sufªcient to effect global climate 
change, and, in turn, why the state attorneys general have ªled such a 
claim.104 While these concerns are certainly legitimate (and exemplify 
the difªculty in fashioning proper tort remedies), they question the 
remedy sought and do not raise concerns about using state common 
law as the underlying cause of action. That said, it is interesting to 
note that the state attorneys general, except Wisconsin, did not target 
facilities in their own states.105
3. Proving Causation 
 Two major issues have arisen in determining the validity of state 
common law public nuisance claims to abate greenhouse gases: 
(1) whether plaintiffs can properly state a claim that the power com-
panies intentionally and unreasonably contributed to global warm-
ing;106 and (2) whether these claims are in conºict with U.S. foreign 
policy or congressional regulation of global warming.107
                                                                                                                      
103 As stated, the complaint also asserts federal common law nuisance claims. Id. ¶ 1. Pro-
fessor Adler has argued that these claims would not likely survive on the merits in light of 
existing federal statutes. Adler, supra note 90 (“Despite their claims, a federal common law 
cause of action for a public nuisance by carbon dioxide emissions is speculative, at best.”). 
While the CAA now has a comprehensive permit program like that of the Clean Water Act, 
which has preempted federal common law (see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 
(1981)), the CAA has not been utilized to regulate carbon dioxide emissions. Therefore, 
since EPA has taken the position that the agency does not have the authority to regulate car-
bon dioxide emissions under the Act (see Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 
2005); 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003)), perhaps “[t]his makes it less likely that courts 
would ªnd preemption of federal common law.” Updates to Environmental Regulation Case-
book, http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/bpercival/casebook/chap2.asp (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2007); see also New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(reserving judgment of the preemption question while noting that the CAA, unlike the CWA, 
did not regulate pollution from all sources). 
104 See Adler, supra note 90; Robert J. Samuelson, Attorney Generals’ Hot Air, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 11, 2004, at A21. 
105 Adler, supra note 90 (“The state AGs could have targeted facilities in their own 
states, bringing a series of state-law-based common law nuisance claims, but that would 
have meant imposing costs at home.”). 
106 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
107 See id. at 274. 
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 Plaintiffs could successfully state a claim for public nuisance un-
der various state laws. As an example, under Wisconsin law, green-
house gas emissions could constitute a public nuisance because these 
gases interfere with public health and public comfort.108 In order to 
effectively ªnd liability for a public nuisance, a plaintiff must show the 
“existence of a public nuisance” and that defendants had “actual or 
constructive notice” of the nuisance.109 Producers of greenhouse 
gases cannot successfully disclaim these elements. They are certainly 
aware that their power plants and facilities emit greenhouse gases 
such as carbon dioxide. 
 Plaintiffs must also show that the defendants’ “failure to abate the 
public nuisance is a cause of plaintiff’s injuries.”110 On its face, proving 
causation might seem like a major challenge for plaintiffs. The defen-
dants argue that plaintiffs cannot prove causation because their emis-
sions represent less than two percent of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions,111 and, while defendants know that their actions contribute to 
global climate change, they do not agree that they could have known 
that such emissions might cause the speciªc injuries asserted by plain-
tiffs.112 In other words, defendants may contribute to global warming, 
but they do not admit that global warming caused detrimental effects 
to the plaintiffs.113 Thus, courts may have to entertain a number of 
scientiªc experts to discuss to what extent our health and natural re-
sources are adversely affected by increases in global temperature. 
While EPA describes many of these concerns as “uncertainties,”114 the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and U.S. Department of 
                                                                                                                      
108 Wisconsin courts have adopted the Restatement deªnition of public nuisance. Mil-
waukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 691 N.W.2d 659, 669 (Wis. 2005); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (2006). The Restatement requirements for 
determining a public nuisance are not the same as those found in the CAA. See, e.g., Clean 
Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000), (“the emission of any air pollutant . . . 
which in his [or her] judgment . . . may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”). 
109 Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 777, 793-94 (Wis. 
2002). 
110 Id. at 794 (emphasis added). 
111 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 47, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Nos. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 04 Civ. 5670(LAP)) (filed Sept. 30, 2004). 
112 Def.’s Reply, at 24, Connecticut. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Nos. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 04 Civ. 5670(LAP)) (filed Nov. 19, 2004). 
113 See id. 
114 U.S. EPA, Global Warming—Climate, Uncertainties, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/ 
globalwarming.nsf/content/climateuncertainties.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
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State have documented the adverse effects of global warming,115 in-
cluding detrimental effects in many areas of the United States.116 
Therefore, while gases that emit foul odors have long been considered 
public nuisances,117 greenhouse gases simply create a different, and 
more scientiªcally complex, harmful effect. 
 However, under Wisconsin’s interpretation of the Restatement, 
speciªc causal identiªcation is not required since “public nuisance is 
focused primarily on harm to the community or general public, as 
opposed to individuals who may have suffered speciªc personal injury 
or speciªc property damage.”118 Plaintiffs need not prove that the de-
fendants’ emitted gases are present in the states suing and that these 
gases became a hazard to the public.119 As the court stated in City of 
Milwaukee v. NL Industries, Inc., “Were it otherwise, the concept of pub-
lic nuisance would have no distinction from the theories underlying 
class action litigation, which serves to provide individual remedies for 
similar harms to large numbers of identiªable individuals.”120 Evi-
dence that power companies each produced carbon dioxide emis-
sions does create a genuine issue of material fact for a court to deter-
                                                                                                                      
115 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, A Report of Working Group II of the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, http://www.grida.no/ 
climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/005.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
116 Id.; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, tbl.SPM-
2, http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg2/017.htm# (last visited Jan. 4, 2007); U.S. 
Dep’t of State, U.S. Climate Action Report—2002, at 110, http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/global 
warming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BNQ7Z/$File/ch6.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
117 See City of Milwaukee v. Milbrew, Inc., 3 N.W.2d 386, 390 (Wis. 1942) (citing 2 
Wood, Law of Nuisances 819, § 609 (3d ed. 1893)); see also Breese v. Wagner, 203 N.W. 
764, 765–66 (Wis. 1925) (afªrming trial court’s conclusion that a constructed roadway was 
a public nuisance for emitting offensive odors). 
118 City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Wis. Ct. App., 2004). 
119 Accord Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 99-5226, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 95, at 
*5–6 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2005); Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 549 (Wis. 2005); cf. NL 
Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d at 893 (rejecting defendants’ claim that “the City must prove, at a 
minimum, that NL Industries’ pigment or lead paint or Mautz’s lead paint is present on 
windows in Target Area properties and that their conduct somehow caused the paint to 
become a hazard to children.”). For further discussion of the individual causation require-
ment, see Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass 
Products Torts, 62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 873, 877 (2005) (citing William M. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. Legal Stud. 109, 131 
(1983)) (noting that Landes and Posner have “mocked” the individual causation require-
ment). See generally Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Beneªt or Public Nui-
sance?, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 825 (2004); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks of and Reactions to 
Underdeterrence in Torts, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 691 (2005); Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Chal-
lenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from Mass Products, 64 Md. L. Rev. 613 (2005). 
120 691 N.W.2d at 893. 
18 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:1 
mine whether defendants knowingly participated in the creation of 
the public nuisance of global warming.121
4. Preemption 
 As discussed in Part II.B supra, the CAA does not preempt com-
mon law nuisance claims. However, an alternative theory is that these 
state claims are preempted due to other congressional action and the 
goals of U.S. foreign policy.122 In this respect, common law claims in 
the greenhouse gas and global warming context are unique because 
trans-boundary greenhouse gas emissions have a global impact and 
are subject to the foreign policy concerns of the political branches of 
government.123
 According to Judge Preska of the Southern District of New York 
in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., in fashioning a remedy, the 
court would be required to consider the impact of the relief granted 
on “the United States’ ongoing negotiations with other nations con-
cerning global climate change” and “the United States’ energy 
sufªciency and thus its national security.”124 Thus, she concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ complaints “present non-justiciable political questions 
that are consigned to the political branches, not the Judiciary.”125 This 
holding has already been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
                                                                                                                      
121 Accord id. at 894 (“Evidence that Mautz and NL Industries each promoted the use of 
lead paint directly to the public and through sales staffs creates a genuine issue of material 
fact for the jury on the question of whether defendants participated in the creation of a 
public nuisance of childhood lead poisoning in the City of Milwaukee.”). While the nui-
sance may affect the suing states, the plaintiffs likely must rely on the law of the source 
states. Only Wisconsin is home to a plaintiff and a defendant power plant. As Professor 
William H. Rodgers, Jr. stated: 
One is tempted to predict that state courts are not likely to be overenthusias-
tic about proposals to mulct local business for the beneªt of strangers resid-
ing across the border. . . . 
 . . . 
 Actually, predictions of outcome are likely to be sensitive not so much to 
the content of the law but to who is applying it. Nuisance law is pretty much 
the same from state to state, and a federal judge sitting in Vermont might be 
disposed to apply New York law for the beneªt of Vermont residents. 
Rodgers, supra note 62, § 4.3, at 287 & n.13. 
122 Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 47, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 
265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Nos. 04 Civ. 5669(LAP), 04 Civ. 5670(LAP)). 
123 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(discussing the congressional and presidential actions relating to global climate change). 
124 Id. at 272. 
125 Id. at 274. 
2007] Rebirth of Environmental Common Law 19 
the Second Circuit, and while there are strong reasons to be skeptical 
of an afªrmance,126 such a ruling, if upheld, is likely limited to the 
global warming context, and the political question doctrine would not 
stop similar nuisance claims against air, land, or water pollutants as 
they are generally not preempted by federal law.127
B. In Lieu of CERCLA 
1. Restoring Hazardous Waste Sites 
 While success stories exist,128 EPA has faced difªculties in imple-
menting the goals of CERCLA, and, in turn, cleaning up sites on the 
National Priorities List (NPL).129 This has occurred for a number of 
reasons including politics and bureaucratic red tape, but the tradi-
tional criticism against CERCLA is that cleanup of Superfund sites is 
too slow and too expensive.130 On the other hand, there may be good 
                                                                                                                      
 
126 One may be skeptical that the Second Circuit will hold that this nuisance case is 
non-justiciable as a political question as this is not the type of case dealing with the internal 
workings of the other branches of government, see Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). 
In addition, the presence of political issues does not necessarily indicate a non-justiciable 
political question. See Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995). Is the question of 
whether global warming equals a public nuisance best left to the political branches? Per-
haps this is a question of institutional competence. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An Old 
Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 Yale L.J. 27 (2003). 
127 See supra Part II. 
128 U.S. EPA, Archived News Articles and Superfund Success Stories, http://www.epa.gov/ 
superfund/accomp/success/index.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
129 For a brief evaluation of Superfund, see Katherine N. Probst & Diane Sherman, 
Success for Superfund: A New Approach for Keeping Score (Apr. 2004), http://www.rff.org/ 
documents/RFF-RPT-SuperfundSuccess.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
130 Part of this failure by EPA to enforce aggressively hazardous waste cleanup is merely 
a result of bureaucratic red tape. In order for EPA to issue administrative orders to another 
federal agency, it must ªrst get acceptance from the Department of Justice. This require-
ment leads to prolonged negotiations, which in turn result in enormously slow responses 
to CERCLA by polluters, including federal facilities. Shane Justin Harvey, Environmental 
Law Survey, 71 Denv. U. L. Rev. 961, 967 (1994). 
Despite Congress’s directives, however, EPA implementation of the federal 
hazardous waste statutes has had a tortured history. Cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites has proceeded slowly. The EPA has failed to meet its statutory 
deadlines, and Congress has severely criticized EPA regulations and policy 
under both RCRA and CERCLA. Several causes account for these problems, 
including the intrusion of partisan politics into Agency operations, the in-
adequacy of Agency resources, and the magnitude of the Agency’s task. These 
recurring difªculties have raised doubts about the viability of agency-forcing 
as an approach to environmental legislation, leading some to call for in-
creased administrative discretion. 
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reason for slow cleanups; it takes signiªcant time and money to pro-
duce scientiªc analysis that will lead to development and implementa-
tion of a site-speciªc remediation plan, especially if risk-tolerance must 
be low. 
 Are CERCLA’s perceived failures due to administrative failure or 
responsible science? The empirical data is insufªcient to answer this 
question. Finding evidence of systematic agency capture is difªcult 
when cleanups are performed by state agencies and EPA regional of-
ªces that may vary greatly in their institutional cultures, effectiveness, 
and reliance on traditional enforcement mechanisms.131 Discussed 
infra, the case of Dyer v. Waste Management of Wisconsin is arguably an 
example of administrative failure or foot-dragging by a potentially re-
sponsible party (PRP).132 Despite multiple time-consuming studies 
and engineering actions, pollution may have continued to migrate from 
a Superfund site into the property of adjacent landowners. 
 In addition, there may be reasons to be concerned about admin-
istrative failure when dealing with a single or dominant-PRP site. The 
single or dominant PRP may strategically subvert agency control and 
cleanup, something much more difªcult to do in the dynamic envi-
ronment of a multiple-PRP site where corporate inºuences will cancel 
out, reducing the possibility of agency capture. Though even in the 
latter cases, a single PRP may control and dominate the multiple-PRP 
litigation and cleanup process, attempting to maximize future proªts 
while negotiating with trustees (for example, it is better to pay little 
and delay now, and instead pay later). 
 At minimum, the sheer number of parties involved in the 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites may result in jumbled and inconsis-
tent enforcement. Evidence exists, however, that EPA embraces poli-
cies which may foreclose expedient cleanup and restoration of dam-
aged property and resources.133 EPA permits “reliance on natural 
                                                                                                                      
Developments in the Law—Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1474 (1986); see also 
Congressional Budget Ofªce, supra note 47. 
131 Federal and state agencies serve as trustees to oversee the cleanup and the natural 
resource damage assessment process. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(rr) (2005) (allowing any 
agency listed in the national contingency plan to be a trustee). 
132 Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County, 
argued Dec. 6, 2004). 
133 Ofªce of Solid Waste, Emergency Response Dir. 9200.4-17P, Use of Moni-
tored Natural Attenuation at Superfund, RCRA Corrective Action, and Under-
ground Storage Tank Site 1–2 (Apr. 21, 1999) [hereinafter OSWER Dir. 9200.4-17P]; 
see also Changes in Utility Infrastructure Raise NEPA Consideration, Army Law., Jul. 1998, at 84, 
85–86. 
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attenuation processes (within the context of a carefully controlled 
and monitored site cleanup approach) to achieve site-speciªc reme-
diation objectives within a time frame that is reasonable compared to 
that offered by other more active methods.”134 Natural attenuation is 
a restoration approach “without human intervention.”135 In other 
words, it is a policy of “no action,”136 allowing for natural processes to 
clean the environment over time. Natural Attenuation is unlike most 
common law jurisprudence where the goal is to restore the polluted 
area in the immediate future.137
 Natural attenuation certainly is an attractive solution for PRPs in 
light of the costly nature of site cleanup.138 Yet it does not encourage 
cleanup in the foreseeable future and instead endorses long-term, 
natural remediation. As other scholars have pointed out, “EPA en-
dorses the use of natural attenuation as long as the proper evaluation 
and monitoring are performed to demonstrate that human health 
and the environment are sufªciently protected.”139 Natural attenua-
tion is permissible so long as the contaminant will decrease over time, 
there is continual monitoring, and the time-frame is reasonable.140 
However, combined with EPA approval of cost-beneªt analysis in 
evaluation for site cleanup options,141 seventy-ªve years can be con-
                                                                                                                      
134See OSWER Dir. 9200.4-17P, supra note 133. 
135 The “natural attenuation processes” that are at work in such a remediation ap-
proach include a variety of physical, chemical, or biological processes that, under favorable 
conditions, act without human intervention to reduce the mass, toxicity, mobility, volume, 
or concentration of contaminants in soil or groundwater. These in-situ processes include: 
biodegradation; dispersion; dilution; sorption; volatilization; radioactive decay; and chemi-
cal or biological stabilization, transformation, or destruction of contaminants. Changes in 
Utility, supra note 133 at 84, 85–86. 
136 Robert G. Knowlton & Jeffrie Minier, Recent Trend for Environmental Compliance Pro-
vides New Opportunities for Land and Water Use at Brownªelds and Other Contaminated Sites, 41 
Nat. Resources J. 919, 928 (2001); see also James W. Hayman, Regulating Point-Source Dis-
charges to Groundwater Hydrologically Connected to Navigable Waters: An Unresolved Question of 
Environmental Protection Agency Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 5 Barry L. Rev. 95, 123–
24 (2005) (“The mantra of EPA is that ‘dilution is not a solution to pollution’ . . . .”). 
137 See infra Part IV. 
138 See Erik Claudio, Comment, How the EPA May Be Selling General Electric Down the 
River: A Law and Economics Analysis of the $460 Million Hudson River Cleanup Plan, 13 Ford-
ham Envtl. L. Rev. 409, 426–32 (2002); Knowlton & Minier, supra note 136, at 928 (“The 
potential cost savings in remediation through the application of the natural attenuation 
strategy . . . .”). 
139 Knowlton & Minier, supra note 136, at 928 (citing OSWER Dir. 9200.4-17P, supra 
note 133). 
140 Id. at 929; see also Changes in Utility, supra note 133, at 85–86. 
141 Knowlton & Minier, supra note 136, at 931–32. 
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sidered a reasonable time period.142 Despite such long time periods, 
EPA allows natural attenuation, although “very cautiously,” to be the 
exclusive remedy at contaminated sites.143
 EPA expects that sites that have a low potential for plume genera-
tion and migration are the best candidates for monitored natural at-
tenuation.144 But concern exists as to whether these strategies are con-
sistently applied across EPA’s regions, or even from one site to another 
within regions.145 It is an open question as to whether regulators are 
“only accept[ing] natural attenuation as a remedy when it meets all ap-
plicable, relevant, and appropriate health requirements.”146 There is a 
very real concern that natural attenuation will be used just to get con-
taminated sites “off-list” without good data and predictions as to 
whether contaminants will actually be removed, and contaminated 
groundwater will not be polluted downgradient in the future.147
 With the possibility of administrative failure in a given case, a 
foot-dragging PRP, and the (over) use of natural attenuation and cost-
beneªt analysis in site cleanup, sites containing a migrating or exist-
ing pollutant affecting a third party may not be remedied within a 
reasonable timeframe. However, under state common law the same 
pollutant would be considered a nuisance and promptly abated. An 
advantage of the common law is that it serves as a tool for more im-
mediate cleanup, in conjunction with CERCLA, to decrease response 
time in dealing with an existing plume and ensure proper remedia-
tion.148 Although, if CERCLA works properly in restoring the polluted 
site and adjacent land, any common law claims may be minimal. 
                                                                                                                      
142 Id. at 931 (citing Robert G. Knowlton, Jr., Beneªt-Cost Analysis of Groundwater Alterna-
tives at the DOE UMTRA Site Near Riverton, WY 18 ( July, 1997) (unpublished report, on ªle 
with authors)). 
143 Changes in Utility, supra note 133, at 85 (citing OSWER Dir. 9200.4-17P, supra note 
133); see also Environmental Law Division Notes, Army Law., Mar 1995, at 35, 36 (stating that 
natural attenuation can be “even a stand-alone remedial alternative”); Nicholas J. Wallwork 
& Mark E. Freeze, Managing Environmental Remediation Under Federal CERCLA, SL080 ALI-
ABA 401, 419 (2006) (stating that natural attenuation can “be selected as a sole-remedy”). 
144 Changes in Utility, supra note 133, at 85; see Stephanie Pullen et al., Recent Develop-
ments in Environmental Law, 30 Urb. Law. 945, 980 (1998) (discussing when the use of 
natural attenuation is appropriate). 
145 See Ann R. Klee & Ernie Rosenberg, The Moribund State of CERCLA Reauthoriza-
tion,,13 Nat. Resources & Env’t 451, 453 (1999). 
146 Environmental Law Division Notes, supra note 143, at 36 (emphasis added). 
147 Joseph E. Odencrantz et al., Natural Attenuation: Is Dilution the Solution?, 40 LUSTLine 
Bulletin 8, 12 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/OUST/cat/LL40NatAtt.pdf. 
148 Another advantage of the common law is clearly the availability of personal injury 
damages, unavailable under CERCLA. See generally Developments in the Law—Toxic Waste 
Litigation, supra note 130, at 1602. 
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2. The Common Law and Dyer v. Waste Management of Wisconsin 
 The now-closed Muskego Sanitary Landªll was permitted to op-
erate in 1954 with consent from the City of Muskego, Wisconsin and 
in 1971 with permission from the Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources (WDNR).149 Unfortunately, private wells near the landªll 
were found to have elevated contaminant levels, eventually resulting 
in the landªll site’s addition to the National Priorities List (NPL) of 
hazardous waste sites eligible for long-term remedial action ªnanced 
under the federal Superfund program.150
 In Dyer v. Waste Management of Wisconsin, landowners allege that 
defendant Waste Management allowed and accepted illegal liquid 
waste to be dumped at the landªll adjacent to their property.151 Plain-
tiffs allege that this waste included vinyl chlorinated solvents used in 
paints and degreasers that degrades into vinyl chloride, a known car-
cinogen, which later migrated from the landªll onto plaintiffs’ prop-
erties.152 The plaintiffs allege that Waste Management did not have a 
license to dump this liquid waste at the Muskego landªll153 and that 
the groundwater quality began to deteriorate around the landªll.154 
The complaint alleges that chlorinated solvents were found at danger-
ous concentrations in adjacent property owners’ ground water, spring-
fed ponds, and drinking water wells.155
 Plaintiffs assert a variety of state common law claims against Waste 
Management, including: (1) negligence (failure to exercise duty of 
reasonable care in operating the landªll); (2) private nuisance (sub-
stantial interference with use and enjoyment of land); and (3) trespass 
(intrusion of hazardous and toxic substances from the landªll onto 
plaintiffs’ properties).156
                                                                                                                      
149 U.S. EPA, NPL Fact Sheets for Wisconsin: Muskego Sanitary Landªll, http://www.epa. 
gov/R5Super/npl/wisconsin/WID000713180.htm (Sept. 2006) (last visited Jan. 4, 2007). 
150 See id. 
151 Complaint at ¶ 4, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wisconsin, Inc. (WMWI), No. 01-CV-1866 
(Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Apr. 13, 2004). Co-author Mark Thomsen is an attorney 
representing the plaintiffs in this case as well as the plaintiffs in the consolidated case of 
Muskego Moose Family Center No. 1057 v. WMWI, No. 04-CV-912 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha 
County Apr. 13, 2004). All materials relating to the Dyer case are available and on ªle with 
the authors. 
152 Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 4. 
153 Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 
154 Id. ¶ 25. 
155 Id. ¶¶ 70–78. 
156 See id. ¶¶ 96–118. 
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 Federal action has proven less than effective in this case. While 
the landªll site was added to the NPL in the mid-1980s, even after re-
medial action, hazardous substances remain above health-based mini-
mum levels.157 The remedial investigation and feasibility study began 
in 1987 and was completed in 1992, construction of the landªll cap 
and gas collection system were completed in 1994, and a limited 
groundwater pump-and-treat system was completed in 1997.158 In 
1998, owners of private residences located near the landªll were no-
tiªed by the WDNR and the State of Wisconsin Department of Health 
and Family Services that vinyl chloride was present in their private 
water supply wells at concentrations that exceeded state and federal 
drinking water standards.159 Thus, federal regulatory action did not 
restore the contaminated area or groundwater to the required regula-
tory standards.160
3. Enforcing State Common Law 
 Statutory omissions, administrative problems, and enforcement 
inefªciencies should not limit common law causes of action that might 
provide additional remedies to landowners. In light of the inadequa-
cies of the federal regime, common law principles have a role to play. 
The common law, ªrst, should not be adversely affected by the federal 
role (for example, CERCLA compliance orders administered by EPA), 
and, second, should force polluters to be seen as violators of state law, 
serving as an important deterrent to environmental pollution.161
 For example, at the preliminary stages of a hazardous waste com-
mon law action, expert witnesses should not be allowed to discuss 
compliance with a consent decree. An expert opinion about an EPA 
compliance order “simply has no appropriate role to play . . . in the 
common law causes of action which are being pursued.”162 A defen-
                                                                                                                      
157 U.S. EPA, NPL Fact Sheets for Wisconsin: Muskego Sanitary Landªll, supra note 149. 
158 Id. 
159 Letter from State of Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res. to Mr. Art Dyer (Apr. 28, 1998) (on 
ªle with authors); Letter from State of Wis. Dep’t of Health and Family Servs. to Mr. and 
Mrs. Anthony Vitrano (Feb. 17, 1998) (on ªle with authors). 
160 U.S. EPA, NPL Fact Sheets for Wisconsin: Muskego Sanitary Landªll, supra note 149 
(“[T]he remedial action resulted in hazardous substances at the site above health-based 
levels . . . .”). 
161 See Charlie Garlow, Environmental Recompense, 1 Appalachian J.L. 1, 9, 17 (2002). 
162 Transcript of Proceedings of Sept. 9, 2004 at 60, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., 
No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Sept. 9, 2004) (quoting Judge Skwierawski, 
and referring to CERCLA’s savings clause, which “preserve[s] common law obligations or 
liabilities under state law”). 
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dant’s compliance with a federally dictated decree should not be rele-
vant as to whether that defendant has violated state nuisance laws. Re-
tired Wisconsin Circuit Court Judge Michael Skwierawski (acting as 
Special Master) stated in Dyer: 
Plaintiffs’ argument about private nuisance causes of action is 
absolutely correct. It is irrelevant whether Waste Manage-
ment’s conduct complied with CERCLA or complied with 
standards set forth in the National Contingency Plan or any 
other place if the Plaintiffs can establish that their conduct 
and the activities on the property caused the leaching of haz-
ardous cancer-causing chemicals into adjacent wells. That’s, I 
think, a fairly straightforward proposition. It doesn’t make any 
difference what they did or didn’t do if that’s what hap-
pened.163
In other words, it is irrelevant whether a defendant has complied with 
the federal rules—statutes, contracts, or otherwise—if there remains a 
failure to comply with state law. Where there is no federal preemp-
tion, states must be free to determine what constitutes environmental 
harm in their own jurisdictions. 
 State common law doctrines can therefore become effective de-
terrents of environmental harms. But, this deterrent effect can only 
occur if compliance (or lack thereof) with the federal regime does 
not automatically dictate a liability ªnding in state jurisdictions.164 
Again, Judge Skwierawski stated: 
The bottom line remains that the—there are independent 
common law obligations as argued by the Plaintiffs on the— 
impressed upon the Defendants that are to be analyzed sepa-
rately and free from and apart from the existence of CERCLA 
consent orders and the listing of actions to be taken pursuant 
to those.165
Consent decrees or compliance orders do not dictate what is an al-
lowable release under state nuisance and trespass laws.166 State law 
                                                                                                                      
 
163 Id. at 61–62. 
164 See id. at 64. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 63 (noting that compliance with a consent decree is not relevant in determin-
ing whether defendant’s conduct was reasonable or constituted a nuisance); see also Gar-
low, supra note 161, at 9 (“[C]ompliance [with natural resource statutes] does not ensure 
that an activity will not be subject to a nuisance claim.”) (citing Galaxy Carpet Mills v. Mas-
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liability should not be affected by the enforcement culture in the fed-
eral government.167 We note that this conclusion cuts both ways. State 
common law may be less environmentally friendly than a federal 
agreement. Thus, a failure to comply with a federal arrangement does 
not necessarily mean there has been a violation of state common law. 
 However, while it is arguably easier for the cause of action to pro-
ceed in this more traditional pollution nuisance case than in the green-
house gas context, discussed supra, the proper remedy may be more 
difªcult to determine.168 Yet, without appropriate (here, common 
law) remedies, there will be no deterrence under state law. As Judge 
Skwierawski stated: 
The plaintiff makes a powerful argument, I think, about the 
fact that if alternative sources of water are supplied and the 
defendants are not required to clean up the mess that they 
have made in the plaintiffs’ view, then there is no deterrent 
in the law. They can turn our underground water supplies 
into sewers and just truck in more water. The community has 
[sic] a whole just kind of sails onward. That’s, depending on 
the jury, a potentially powerful argument that may inºuence 
a jury to agree with the plaintiffs’ version of restoration dam-
ages being the most reasonable measure and the appropriate 
measure to be assessed. It may inºuence one way or the other 
the trial judge at the same time.169
 Thus, property owners or possessors may have a right to a clean 
underground water supply, and the remedy that will fully compensate 
such persons for the breach of this right must include cost of restora-
tion damages.170
                                                                                                                      
sengill, 338 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. 1986); Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 
(Ill. 1981); Neal v. Darby, 318 S.E.2d 18 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)). 
167 Transcript of Proceedings of Sept. 9, 2004 at 62–63, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., 
Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Sept. 9, 2004) (“[S]tandards under 
the common law requiring a landowner not to create a nuisance, public or private, cannot 
be set by a process which is subject to the current whims in enforcement.”). 
168 See Massachusetts v. EPA 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
169 Transcript of Proceedings of Dec. 6, 2004 at 62–63, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., 
Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Dec. 6, 2004) (Skwierawski, J.); see 
also infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
170 See Transcript of Proceedings of Dec. 6, 2004 at 62–63, Dyer v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., 
Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Dec. 6, 2004) (Skwierawski, J.); see 
also infra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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4. The Remedy and Damages 
 The common law has long recognized the importance of a clean 
environment for private property owners and the public at large,171 
and “[t]hose who poison the land must pay for its cure.”172 The Wis-
consin Court of Appeals observed “that access to, and use of, an un-
deªled underground water supply is a right of private occupancy,”173 
and therefore, it has been the law of Wisconsin and other states “that 
the cost of repairing and restoring damaged property and water to its 
original condition is a proper measure of compensatory damages.”174
 Restoration cost is an additional appropriate measure of damages 
even when the diminution in value to the plaintiffs’ properties is con-
sidered.175 Courts have occasionally applied the rule that a plaintiff is 
entitled instead to the lesser of the “cost of repairs or diminution in 
value.”176 However, this should not be a steadfast rule to be applied in 
every case.177 For example, the court in Roman Catholic Church of the 
Archdiocese of New Orleans v. Louisiana Gas Service Co.,178 recognized that 
the “diminished value land rule” is an archaic rule that does not truly 
compensate a land owner for the wrongful acts of a defendant: 
                                                                                                                      
171 William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 218 (Garland 
Pub., 1978) (1783) (noting that it is a nuisance “to corrupt or poi[s]on a water-cour[s]e”); 
see also Hammack v. Mo. Clean Water Comm’n, 659 S.W.2d 595, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) 
(“Clean water is the essence and lifeblood of our society. Without it we will perish.”). 
172 State Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983). 
173 City of Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co., 493 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). 
174 Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 665 N.W.2d 257, ¶ 57 (Wis. 
2003) (quoting Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis. v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718, 725 (Wis. 1997)); Anstee v. 
Monroe Light & Fuel Co., 177 N.W. 26, 27 (Wis. 1920) (“Since no further recurrence of 
the nuisance is likely to take place, the court properly assessed damages for future as well 
as past injury to soil and well occasioned by the acts of the defendant complained of. In 
this way, and in this way only, could plaintiff be made whole in one action for the loss sus-
tained by him by reason of the acts of nuisance already committed by the defendant.”); 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Smith, 238 S.W. 56, 59 (Ark. 1922) (“[T]he measure of [plain-
tiff’s] damage was not as for a total destruction of his well and the cost of digging another 
one, as the learned trial judge found, but the expense which [plaintiff] would necessarily 
have to incur in order to restore his well to its former use.”). Under current law, individual 
plaintiffs are entitled to the restoration damages. Compare this outcome to the common 
fund discussed infra Part IV. 
175 Laska v. Steinpreis, 231 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Wis. 1975). 
176 See, e.g., id. For a discussion of doctrines to award restoration damages, see James R. 
Cox, Reforming the Law Applicable to the Award of Restoration Damages as a Remedy for Environ-
mental Torts, 20 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 777, 781–802 (2003). 
177 See Sch. Dist. No. 15 of Town of Granville v. Kunz, 24 N.W.2d 598, 599 (Wis. 1946) 
(“A reasonable argument could be made that in any case the cost of rectifying the damage 
is the proper measure even though it may exceed the diminution in value of the damaged 
property . . . .”). 
178 618 So.2d 874, 877 (La. 1993). 
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Recently, courts and commentators have criticized . . . sim-
plistic tests which require the automatic application of limi-
tations on an owner’s recovery of the cost to restore or re-
pair his damaged property. Such ceilings on recovery not 
only seem unduly mechanical but also seem wrong from the 
point of view of reasonable compensation. If the plaintiff 
wishes to use the damaged property, not sell it, repair or res-
toration at the expense of the defendant is the only remedy 
that affords full compensation. To limit repair costs to dimi-
nution in value is to either force a landowner to sell the 
property he wishes to keep or to make repairs partly out of 
his own pocket. Rules governing the proper measure of 
damages in a particular case are guides only and should not 
be applied in an arbitrary, formulaic, or inºexible manner, 
particularly where to do so would not do substantial justice. 
Limiting the costs of repairs to the diminution in value of 
the property appears to ºy in the face of the rule requiring 
that the injured party be restored to his former position.179
As one commentator stated, “Anachronistic limitations on recovery 
based on property value fail to take into account the public’s interest 
in ensuring an effective cleanup.”180
IV. The Common Law Fund 
 Stated simply, the common law strives for immediate cleanup of 
pollution and condemns the destruction of the natural environment. 
Federal environmental law, such as the CAA and CERCLA, strive for 
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. (citing Myers v. Arnold, 403 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)) (awarding $3.6 
million to repair structural damage to an historic church building even though church 
had no present intention to restore) (internal quotations omitted); see also St. Martin v. 
Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S. Inc., 224 F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 2000) (afªrming 
restoration damages award of $10,000 per acre which exceeded the purchase price and 
market value of approximately $245 per acre); C.R.T., Inc. v. Brown, 602 S.W.2d 409, 410 
(Ark. 1980) (“The fact that it would be expensive to restore the land to its former condi-
tion [was] not reason alone to overrule [restoration damages].”); Council of Unit Owners 
v. Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc., 564 A.2d 357, 361–62 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (in a case 
where plaintiffs alleged between $13 and $15 million in restoration damages and defen-
dants alleged that the market value of the properties had increased, the court established 
the measure of damages as the “cost of repair”). 
180 Cox, supra note 176, at 809. There are outer-limits to restoration value as the fact-
ªnder should, in determining damages, take into account what can be remedied cost-
effectively (in contrast to looking at the point of harmful exposure) and the underlying 
conduct of the defendant. See id. at 808. 
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similar outcomes, as the statutes’ goals are deterrence, environmental 
protection, and reduction and elimination of pollution.181 However, 
CERCLA cleanups and consent decrees typically focus on federal stan-
dards, and not the often higher state standards.182 Determining nui-
sance under state common law, however, would look to state air qual-
ity or toxic release standards.183
 The argument against using state common law is that it will lead 
to increased litigation costs without the beneªt of established federal 
norms, as well as buck the recent trend to engage in faster, voluntary 
cleanup with higher risk tolerance; hence the use of natural attenua-
tion and cost beneªt analysis.184 However, under state common law, 
cleanup can occur under state mandated contaminant levels (which 
would determine what constitutes a nuisance under state law) and 
judicially mandated time frames, working with additional ªnancial 
resources. 
 For example, the Wisconsin state standard for vinyl chloride in 
drinking water is 0.2 parts per billion (ppb),185 while the federal stan-
dard is a much higher 2.0 ppb.186 If landowners are to have full bene-
ªcial use of their property,187 there must be immediate cleanup to 
achieve the federal standard instead of waiting many years for natural 
cleanup, and if landowners are to have full use and enjoyment, then 
any cleanup and restoration initiative must respond to state stan-
dards—a choice that would promote environmental federalism.188
 State common law, given the arguably ineffective existing federal 
regime, makes it possible to achieve pollution deterrence and cleanup 
in the foreseeable future under higher standards, and provides addi-
tional funds to reach an under-funded goal.189 “From the standpoint 
of a plaintiff whose property has become contaminated by environ-
mental pollutants, damage remedies that are designed to promote full 
                                                                                                                      
181 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006); Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d 432, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
182 Cox, supra note 176, at 779–80. 
183 See Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to Affect 
the Location of Pollution, 27 Envt. L. 403, 460–61 (1997). 
184 See id. at 414–15. 
185 Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, Vinyl Chloride (2004), avail-
able at http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/eh/ChemFS/fs/VC.htm. 
186 U.S. EPA, Consumer Factsheet on: Vinyl Chloride, http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/ 
contaminants/dw_contamfs/vinylchl.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
187 After all, the federal Maximum Contaminant Level Goal is zero. Id. 
188 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 130, 135–36 (2005); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federal-
ism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 108 (2005). 
189 See Adler, supra note 188, at 135–36. 
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restoration of property have been slow to evolve.”190 The following 
proposal for a common law fund doctrine, consistent with other equi-
table proposals to expand the scope of restoration remedies,191 will 
help by creating more available resources and moving pollution 
cleanup and deterrence efforts along. 
A. Description 
 Judges have long invoked their equitable powers “to adopt ap-
propriate remedies to meet the exigencies of a given case,”192 espe-
cially when the case requires creative, ºexible, and imaginative reme-
dies because traditional forms of monetary relief, such as loss of 
property value, are inadequate.193 Implementation of a common law 
equitable remedy—the common law fund—would further promote 
the use of state common law doctrines to restore and repair our natu-
ral resources. 
 Fashioned by state court judges, the common law fund would al-
low—and possibly mandate in the interests of public policy—damages 
to be paid into a fund that could be used to restore plaintiffs’ prop-
erty, often adjacent to hazardous waste disposal sites, damaged by pol-
lutants. While money would go to pay for attorney contingency fees194 
and named plaintiffs may receive some remuneration, the substantial 
majority of the damages paid would go to restoration, an outcome 
that often takes too much time due to a shortage of federal resources. 
Attorneys would be willing to take cases subject to the common law 
fund because attorneys fees would be paid, and private plaintiffs—
                                                                                                                      
190 Cox, supra note 176, at 809. 
191 See generally Cox, supra note 176, at 777, 805 (suggesting that courts should expand 
existing equitable trust doctrines and apply them to awards of environmental restoration 
damages, and noting that it has been suggested by at least one court). 
192 State v. Seigel, 472 N.W. 584 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). 
193 See Howard W. Brill, Equitable Remedies for Common Law Torts, 1999 Ark. L. Notes 1, 
13 (recognizing the need for “alternative creative remedies when a simple exchange of 
money as a form of substitutionary relief was inadequate[,]” and stating that “[e]quity has 
inherent and broad powers to fashion, shape and indeed create a remedy to prevent, or if 
time has passed, to correct a wrong. Those powers also exist, to be exercised creatively and 
imaginatively, when the wrong to an individual is deªned by the rights ºowing from the 
millennium-long growth of the common law.”). 
194 See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984) (“[U]nder the ‘common fund 
doctrine’ . . . a reasonable fee is based on a percentage of the fund bestowed on the class 
. . . .”); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17456, at *9–11 
(D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2005) (citing Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)) 
(“Courts have long recognized that a lawyer who recovers a ‘common fund’ for the class 
she represents is entitled to be paid a reasonable attorneys’ fee and her expenses prior to 
the distribution of the balance to the class.”). 
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especially environmentally oriented ones or ones who think cleanup 
of their property is worth more than the lost market value of their 
property195—would make use of the doctrine, as would non-proªt en-
vironmental groups that now would have a mechanism to fund law-
yers.196 The amount of money to be paid into the fund would be pro-
jected reasonable restoration costs, and judges would not have to 
allocate damages among various plaintiffs. Thus, plaintiffs would have 
a remedy available that would allow for direct cleanup and full use of 
their property in the post-restoration future, rather than be paid only 
a likely smaller amount for their property value diminution.197
 In addition, the fund would promote efªciency and would pro-
tect all future individuals who might be harmed by pollution. Without 
the fund to clean up all adjacent lands, there is the potential for fu-
ture, more costly lawsuits by landowners downgradient.198 This poten-
tial will provide a strong incentive for PRPs to move early and cleanup 
now, creating more sustainable business practices, and the fund could 
resolve all liability for defendants as to potential future plaintiffs. 
 The common law fund (here, the actual monies) would require 
judicial oversight to see that the fund is used properly to support 
more aggressive, and possibly agency-supervised, cleanup and restora-
tion.199 A cleanup and restoration plan may be mandated by the court 
itself—or in conjunction with a court appointed trustee, such as a state 
environmental protection agency—or the fund could be used to sup-
port an existing cleanup plan.200 In other words, the court, as part of 
approving the settlement or as a judicial ªnding, would direct that 
cleanup would commence. CERCLA would not preempt such a rem-
edy because the fund would further effective cleanup by providing 
                                                                                                                      
195 The common law fund is useful where the resource is undervalued by the market. 
See supra Part III (discussing the inadequacy of measuring damages by diminution of 
value). See generally Czarnezki & Zahner, supra note 44 (discussing the undervaluation of 
non-use values, and discussing the importance of receiving full restoration costs). 
196 Accord Cox, supra note 176, at 802 (stating that a “‘constructive trust’ or ‘equitable 
trust’ . . . could be created for the beneªt of future property owners, neighbors, and/or 
for interested members of the general public”). 
197 1 Daniel P. Selmi & Kenneth A. Manaster, State Environmental Law § 3.23 
(2005) (“A consistent theme in case law discussions of nuisance remedies is ºexibility in 
the judicial approach to the problem. The court’s basic aim is to adjust the conºict in a 
pragmatic way and to settle on a remedy that will intrude least on the prerogatives of 
property owners.”). 
198 Cox, supra note 176, at 780 (discussing the interest in intergenerational equity). 
199 Accord Cox, supra note 176, at 807 (stating that the fund “should be administered 
for the beneªt of future property owners and members of the public”). 
200 See Cox, supra note 176, at 808–09. 
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direct resources to the trustees or plaintiffs in control of the cleanup 
process.201
 The common law fund addresses the view that restoration is the 
only appropriate remedy. For example, hazardous waste might pollute 
well-water. Damages as a measure of diminution of property value of-
ten may be less than the value to a landowner of having clean ground-
water. What if diminution of value were accompanied by an alterna-
tive water source?202 Polluters should not be able to destroy public 
resources, so long as they can provide injured parties with, for exam-
ple, a lifetime and unlimited supply of bottled water or a connection 
to municipal water. Instead, nuisance law and the common law fund, 
like environmental statutes, are meant to both deter pollution and 
restore already polluted areas.203
 Creation of the common law fund is not only within the equitable 
powers of the judiciary, but its development is supported by the ration-
ales for other fund-like arrangements.204 For example, using their equi-
table powers, judges in the class action context may invoke the cy pres 
doctrine and allow for funds to be distributed, instead of individually, 
for a beneªt other than direct cash compensation to the plaintiffs.205 
Such distributions, like the use of the common law fund in environ-
mental cases, can be used successfully because there is a close nexus 
between the injury (the plaintiff’s property damaged by pollution) and 
the distribution (to the common fund), which would be used to rem-
                                                                                                                      
201 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. A recent decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1233, 2006 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 26993 (10th Cir. 2006), attempts to clarify what remedies are available under 
state common law when EPA maintains ongoing remediation efforts. On the one hand, 
New Mexico limits the preemptive effect of CERCLA, permits usage of common law 
claims, and supports common law damage remedies so long as the monies are used for 
restoration and remediation purposes. See id. at *53–54, *60–61, *64–68. On the other 
hand, the court explicitly questions whether common law claims can be brought before 
EPA remediation efforts are completed, or, possibly, unless EPA admits that there will be 
no remedial action on a certain piece of real property. Id. at *72–74. 
202 Under many circumstances the diminished market value is not sufªcient to make 
the plaintiff whole. Does the furnishing of water or an alternative source of water make a 
plaintiff whole in this case together with whatever diminished market value may have oc-
curred to these properties? See Transcript of Proceedings of Dec. 6, 2004 at 61, Dyer v. 
Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., No. 01-CV-1866 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Waukesha County Dec. 6, 2004). 
203 See, e.g., Czarnezki & Zahner, supra note 44, at 525. 
204 Like CERCLA’s Superfund, fund arrangements are often found in statutory provi-
sions. See Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1824 (2006); Oil Spill Li-
ability Trust Fund, 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2006). 
205 See 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 11.20 
(4th ed. 2002). 
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edy a much wider class of individuals (here, restore damaged property 
of many adjacent landowners).206 In fact, the common law fund would 
directly beneªt the plaintiffs, unlike traditional uses of cy pres that pro-
vide for more indirect beneªts (discounts, charitable donations). 
 In addition, companies may be more willing to make payments 
for an environmental fund rather than direct payments to injured 
plaintiffs,207 and the fund avoids the possible unjust enrichment if 
plaintiffs would not “expend the recovered sums on actual property 
restoration.”208 Finally, a common law fund may be the only way to 
truly compensate injured plaintiffs. Like a class action suit, the num-
ber of individuals whose property is damaged may be large and many 
potential plaintiffs are unlikely to ªle a claim,209 meaning the com-
mon law fund may be the only way to ensure adequate cleanup and 
restoration,210 an outcome worth the potential windfall to non-
plaintiffs whose land or water source may be restored.211
                                                                                                                      
206 See, e.g., In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 
197, 209 (D. Me. 2003) (“[M]embers of the public (and thus potentially class members 
who did not ªle a claim, as well as those who did) will beneªt either in using the CDs 
themselves or in the general public beneªt from recurrent music CD availability.”); cf. 
Stewart R. Shepherd, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 448, 457 (1972) (“The goal of the cy pres remedy . . . is to effectuate the normal dam-
age distribution to class members as closely as possible, and this should be the purpose of 
the courts whenever feasible.”). 
207 Companies are often more willing to pay to charitable funds. See, e.g., New York v. 
Reebok Int’l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 
160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1393 (N.D. Ga. 2001); New York v. Dairylea Coop., Inc., 1985 WL 
1825 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
208 Cox, supra note 176, at 802. 
209 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484–85 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev’d on other 
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The class action is particularly appropriate where 
those who have allegedly been injured are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either 
because they do not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expen-
sive.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
210 Cf. United States District Judge D. Brock Hornby, Panel: The Use of “Coupon” Compensa-
tion and Other Non-Pecuniary Redress, Federal Trade Commission Workshop, Sept. 13, 2004, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/classaction/writ_materials/hornby.pdf. 
211 See 3 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 10.22 
(4th ed. 2002) (“To the extent that cy pres distribution actually beneªts a sufªcient num-
ber of injured class members, the monies paid to third parties are an incidental but neces-
sary cost that must be accepted in order to confer the beneªts in a feasible way to a large 
proportion of the injured class members. This result is fully consistent with and promotes 
the historic objectives of class actions, which were originally created as a court rule of con-
venience.”). 
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B. Application 
 The common law fund is more easily applied to a case involving 
hazardous waste releases where restoration costs may exceed diminu-
tion in property value.212 The fund can be used to cleanup waste from 
the property and begin immediate restoration efforts. However, in 
some cases, restoration in the traditional sense is not possible.213 For 
example, while air pollution can cause damage that allows for retro-
spective correction in the greenhouse gas context—for example, 
cleaning off black soot or treating asthma in children—the air pollu-
tion is also trans-boundary, without “on the ground” effects as easily 
detectable or remedied; this allows for only prospective relief in pub-
lic nuisance cases to reduce greenhouse gases that cause global warm-
ing.214 In these cases, the common law fund could be used, as an al-
ternative to percentage reduction goals, for mandated use of better 
technology and research to develop new technology to stop future 
emissions.215 The fewer emissions in the future would then offset past 
production, and industry may be more willing to endow a ªxed amount 
into a fund rather than deal with technology-forcing future reductions 
that might result in business losses of unknown magnitude. 
 The idea of the common law fund can be an effective remedy 
because it allows for both prospective and retrospective relief; thus 
appeasing both those who seek restoration—governments and envi-
ronmentalists—and those who lost and expended resources as a result 
of the pollution, plaintiffs and the plaintiff’s bar.216 The common law 
fund mirrors the supposed restoration and deterrence goals of CER-
CLA and other federal environmental statutes, and administrative 
agencies will be willing to work with affected plaintiffs if they know 
they might have an additional restoration fund available, leading to 
less pollution in the future, and more efªcient and faster cleanups.217
                                                                                                                      
212 See Cox, supra note 176, at 807 (discussing the similar case of Ewell v. Petro Proces-
sors, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1978). 
213 See Garlow, supra note 161, at 10 (discussing the Exxon-Valdez disaster and limita-
tions on retroactive cleanup). 
214 See id. at 16–17. 
215 Cf. Garlow, supra note 161, at 17 (“Only by requiring that the violator reduce 
air/water pollution in an amount equal to or greater than the illegal emissions will viola-
tors begin to restore the environment they have damaged.”). 
216 See Cox, supra note 176, at 779. 
217 See id. at 780. 
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Conclusion 
 Federal administrative agencies are designed to enforce federal 
law. In the environmental context, EPA, with the resources it has 
available, must look at polluters and victims on a case by case basis to 
determine the appropriate course of action, whether such action is a 
consent decree, litigation, a compliance letter, restoration, or nothing 
at all. In this manner, administrative agencies function as common law 
courts determining the rights and remedies of the players in the envi-
ronmental game.218 However, if federal administrative agencies are, in 
fact, at least in some cases, ineffective common law courts because 
they do not regulate environmental harms or cannot provide certain 
remedies, then potential plaintiffs should invest their efforts in the 
state common law.219 State common law doctrines can effectively de-
termine what is an unreasonable act using state promulgated envi-
ronmental standards, and provide for alternative or additional reme-
dies. Meanwhile, judicially crafted remedies like the common law 
fund—allowing portions of state court damages to be paid to a resto-
ration fund—can effectively promote both restoration and deterrence 
where federal action has proven less than effective. 
                                                                                                                      
218 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco A Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common 
Law Courts, 47 Duke L.J. 1013 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 
107 Yale L.J. 529, 533 (1997) (“Justice Scalia’s discussion neglects the possibility that ad-
ministrative agencies can discharge some of the functions of common law courts without 
compromising democratic values.”). 
219 Cf. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary 
Administrative Agencies, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2010, 2011 (1997) (arguing that judges are al-
ready in a good position to act as “temporary administrative agencies” to deal with com-
plex cases). 
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